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VI 
JURISDICTION 
This Appellate Court has jurisdiction over his appeal because the summary 
judgment order constituted a final judgment under section 78-2-2 of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 1. The court erred in granting summary judgment to Rasekh based 
upon a finding that there was no applicable statutorily created fiduciary duty that 
would apply to Rasekh based upon the facts of this case. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to tne losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE NO. 2. The court erred in granting summary judgment to Rasekh based 
upon the finding that there was no evidence in the record that would support a 
finding of a confidential relationship. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE NO. 3. The court erred in granting summary judgment to Rasekh based 
upon a finding that Bingham's own actions precluded Rasekh from selling the 
property and therefore an oral promise to sell the property if the purchase did not 
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work out cannot be enforced as a matter of law. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE NO. 4. The court erred in granting summary judgment to Rasekh based 
upon a finding that Rasekh did not have a duty to investigate and therefore there is 
no basis for a finding of negligent misrepresentations. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS FOURTH ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE NO. 5. The court erred in granting summary judgment to Rasekh based 
upon a finding that a promise to repurchase the center if it was unprofitable is 
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS FIFTH ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, 
1. The Plaintiff filed her amended complaint in May of 1988, claiming, 
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among other things, causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, breach of 
fiduciary duty and conflict of interest against Defendants Rasekh and Coldwell 
Bankers; negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract against Defendants Michael 
Drury and VRUtah; and causes of negligent misrepresentation and recission of 
contract and restitution against the defendants Harvey C. and Lois R. Hirshi ("the 
Hirschis"). All of the defendants filed counterclaims. 
2. All of the defendants filed summary judgment motions. After the trial 
court granted the motions, the Hirschis and defendants Michael Drury and VRUtah, 
Inc. settled their disputes with the Appellant. 
3. On August 14, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of the Hirschis. 
4. On October 10, 2000, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision in 
which it granted Rasekh's, Michael Drury and VRUtah's Motions for Summary 
Judgment. 
5. On October 31, 2000, the trial court entered a judgment in which the 
lower court dismissed all of Appellant's claims against the Hirschis. 
6. On November 6, 2000, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal appealing the 
lower court's judgments. 
7. On November 15, 2000, the Hirschis filed an objection to Appellant's 
Notice of Appeal on the basis there was no final judgment because the lower court 
had not determined the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded in connection with 
the Hirschis judgment. 
8. On December 8, 2000, the Utah Supreme Court entered its Order 
dismissing the Appeal. 
9. On June 4, 2001, the lower court entered its Order dismissing the claims 
3 
against Drury and VRUtah, Inc. 
10. On June 19, 2001, the lower court entered its Order dismissing 
Appellant's claims against the Hirschis and the Hirschis counterclaims against 
Appellant, each party to bear their own costs and attorneys fees. 
11. On July 20, 2001, Appellant filed the instant Notice of Appeal challenging 
the lower court's Judgment in favor of defendant Kal Rasech. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A, Preliminary Statement: 
The Appellant's Statement of Facts, relevant to the issues presented for review, 
are the same Facts as found in Appellant's "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Kal Rasekh's Motion for Summary Judgment/7 as filed in the Court below. 
See App Exh. pp 172-181. For the Court's convenience, immediately following the 
number for each of Appellant's Fact Statements, are ellipses ( ) within the ellipse is 
found the corresponding numbered contested facts as found in the paragraph or 
paragraphs for the Statement of Fact as found in Appellee's two Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as filed below. See App Exh. pp. 149-
157. The references in support of each Fact Statement are to the pages in Appellants 
Addendum, filed in support of Appellant's Brief on Appeal i.e. App Exh p " " . 
B. Statement of Facts: 
1 .(2) The Appellant, Marie Bingham, at the time she purchased the Hirschi 
Center was an unsophisticated person who had little if any comprehension of the 
magnitude of the transaction in which she was induced to enter in by the Defendant 
Kal Rasekh. (App Ex pg. 18 (dep pp. 65-66); App Ex pg. 20 (dep pp. 77-78); App Ex 
pg. 40. (dep pp 314-316), App Exh. p. 216. 
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2. (2) Mrs. Bingham was a divorcee. App Ex. pg 49, 216 (dep pg. 423). Her 
family consisted of nine children. App Ex pg. 40 (dep p. 314). Her working 
experience had been that of a sales clerk and substitute teacher. (App Ex. pp 13-
14(dep pp. 9-15). Her education beyond high school had consisted of two years of 
part time schooling to qualify for entrance into a nursing curriculum. (App Ex p. 13 
(dep p. 11); App Exh. p. 38a - 38b (dep pp. 292-293). 
3. (2, 3) Mr. Rasekh ingratiated himself into Mrs. Bingham's family, learned 
of her financial circumstances and became her financial advisor. App Exh. pp. 39-
40, (dep. p 305-307, 316), App Exh. pp. 211-212. Mr. Rasekh's ingratiation was 
very clever often referring to her as his "American mom." App Exh pp. 58 (dep pp. 
63-64); App. Exh p. 38 (dep p. 254); App Exh pp. 207-209. 
4.(2) This relationship of trust and confidence is evidenced by the fact that 
Mr. Rasekh asked Mrs. Bingham if he could marry either her daughter Jennifer or 
Brittany as a prerequisite to obtaining U.S. Citizenship. App Exh pp. 54-56, (dep pp. 
48-55, 58), App Exh. pp. 208-209. 
5.(2) As a result of the relationship he cultivated, Mrs. Bingham trusted him 
with the care of her daughter Brittany whom Mr. Rasekh took to Egypt to attend the 
wedding of his sister. (App Exh. pp. 57, (dep pp. 59). 
6. (2,3) Mrs. Bingham relied on Mr. Rasekh to make her business decisions. 
App. Exh pp. 46, (dep pp. 379); App Exh p. 48 (dep pp. 417), App pp. 208-209, 211-
212. 
7.(2) In July of 1994, Rasekh contacted Bingham and told her he had just left 
the Hirschi Center, a day care business, and that it was a perfect investment for her. 
He told her that he had exempted his father from the listing agreement so that 
Bingham and his sister could purchase and operate the day care. He told her he 
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would meet her at his office because it would have to be tied up fast. App Exh. pp. 
196 (Bingham Aff. <{] <U 14-16) 
8.(2) When Bingham first learned of the $900,000 price she was 
overwhelmed and told Rasekh there was no way she could be involved. He told 
Bingham there was no risk that he had thoroughly investigated the business and 
property and if Bingham would go in business with his sister and operate the day 
care there was enough income to support the both of them. App Exh. pp. 196 
(Bingham Aff. <H<[]14-17) 
9. (2,22) He presented Bingham with a document he had prepared which she 
did not read and which he said was necessary to tie up the property. Bingham was at 
first skeptical, but, Rasekh had her sign the document and give him $5,000 to hold 
the property until his sister could come. At the time Rasekh told Bingham he would 
later negotiate the actual price and figure out the business relationship between 
Bingham and his sister. App Exh. pp. 196-197 (Bingham Aff. <j] <H 14-17) 
10.(2) At this time Rasekh told Bingham that if he were not able to negotiate a 
better price that Bingham would get her $5,000 back. App Exh. pp. 196-
197(Bingham Aff. <H<H14-17) 
11 .(2) Bingham signed the document Rasekh prepared without reading it 
because she fully trusted Rasekh because of their confidential relationship and the 
believe he instilled in her that he would protect her and was looking out for her best 
interests. App Exh. pp. 196 (Bingham Aff. ^ Tl 14-17) 
12. Later he came to Bingham's home and discussed the need to sell her 
home so as to come up with her share of the money to purchase the Hirschi Center. 
Rasekh told Bingham his sister was coming from Egypt soon and he would start to 
look for a buyer for her house. App Exh. pp. 197 (Bingham Aff. *H 18) 
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13.(3) During this time Rasekh presented Bingham with several additional 
offers and counter offers which he was negotiating she believed for both she and his 
sister. 
14.(5) Shortly thereafter Rasekh told Bingham his sister was not coming and 
would not be participating in the purchase. At this time Bingham told Rasekh there 
was no possible way she could be involved because she knew nothing about 
operating a day care let alone any other kind of business. App Exh. pp. 196 
(Bingham Aff. H19) 
15.(2,3,5) At this time Rasekh, put increased pressure on Bingham to proceed 
with the purchase by assuring me that he had investigated the business and there was 
nothing that could go wrong. He told Bingham that she could walk into the 
Hirschi's shoes and would need no further capital. App Exh. p. 30-32, (dep p. 187-
190, 192, 196); App Exh p. 44, 45, (dep p. 349, 356.). 
16.(6) At this time Bingham consulted her brother David Weston who told her 
she should not purchase the Center because she was not qualified and not until she 
determined that the business was profitable and would not require any money 
beyond the purchase price. App Exh. pp. 197-198 (Bingham Aff. ^ *H 21) 
17. Bingham told Rasekh what her brother had said and at this time he told 
her "Marie there is no risk, if it doesn't work out I will either buy it from you or sell 
it for you/' Besides, he said, "why would you not trust my advice over that of your 
brother or daughters, are they as successful as I am, look at my success Marie, trust 
me there is no risk and I wil l not let you down/ ' App Exh. pp. 198-203; 41-42 (dep 
pp 317-323; also App Exh pp. 35-37 (dep pp 237,244,247). 
18.(6) Rasekh told her the Hirschi's had provided him with all of the financial 
information about the business and that the day care center and the wedding 
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receptions held there had supported two families for many years. He arranged for 
her to talk to the Hirschi's about the profitability of their business. The Hirschi's then 
provided her with financial statements. App Exh. pp. 198 (Bingham Aff. <[|23) 
19.(6) She did not know how to read a financial statement so Bingham asked 
her friend Stan to look at the financial statements and He told her the statements 
were just break even or showed a loss. App Exh. pp. 198 (Bingham Aff. ^ 23) 
20.(6) When she confronted both Rasekh and Mr. Hirschi, they both told her 
the financial statements were not accurate because the Hirschi' had commingled the 
living expenses of two families with the operating expenses of the business and that if 
she subtracted out the living expenses the statements would show a good profit. App 
Exh. pp. 198 (Bingham Aff. <H24) 
21 .(7) Rasekh then introduced her to Mr. Tilbey, their accountant, to assure 
her that he would continue to do the Center's accounting after she took over. Mr. 
Tilbey told her he could not extract the personal family living expenses from the 
operating expenses. She was again concerned because of what her brother David 
had told her. When she expressed her concerns to Rasekh he again persuaded her 
by telling her that he had analyzed the financial statements and if the business could 
support two families it could assuredly support one. App Exh. pp. 198-199 
(Bingham Aff. <fl 25) 
22.(7) At this time, Rasekh again reassured her, "Marie there is no risk, just 
trust me, if anything goes wrong I wil l get you out/ ' App Exh. pp. 198-199 
(Bingham Aff. <H25) 
23.(8,9) Rasekh then traveled to Egypt and while he was gone Bingham went 
to the Hirschi Center on her own and came away with the feeling that something 
was just not right. When Rasekh returned Bingham told him she could not go 
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through with buying the Center. Rasekh got very upset and intimidating and again 
accused her of not trusting him and that she was harming the Hirschis. He made her 
feel terrible and she then told him that in the very beginning he had at least promised 
a lower price. App Exh. pp. 199 (Bingham Aff. *H27) 
24.(9) Rasekh then met with the Hirschi's alone and then later included 
Bingham in the discussions. Rasekh told her the Hirschi's had agreed to reduce the 
price and to delay the monthly payments to assure her success. At this time Bingham 
looked to Mrs. Hirschi, for reassurance and asked her "knowing my lack of 
experience do you think I could really handle this and could I really do this/' App 
Exh. pp. 199 (Bingham Aff. 1128) 
25.(9) Mrs. Hirschi's response led her to believe that the Hirschi Center day 
care business would support her family without the requirement for any money 
beyond the down payment. App Exh pp. 21-22, (dep pp. 92,93); see also App Exh. p. 
60, (dep p. 102). 
26.(9) Rasekh also told Bingham that the Hirschi's had agreed that their 
daughter, would continue to manage the Center and would train Bingham for six 
months. He also told Bingham that that all of the trained staff would continue and 
that all of the day to day lesson and activity programs for the children were fully 
developed and available for her use. He said "Marie all you have to do is work hard 
and the Center wil l take care of all your needs/7 App Exh. pp. 197 (Bingham Aff. 
1120) 
27.(10, 6) Because of Rasekh' s assurance, among others, that her investment 
was completely safe because if anything went wrong he would either purchase the 
property from her or sell it for her such that she would not suffer any financial loss, in 
early October, 1994, Bingham purchased the Hirschi Center. App Exh pp. 41,42 
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(dep pp. 318, 322); App Exh p. 25 (dep p. 122). Prior to October of 1994, she had 
never worked in a day care center or operated a day care center. App Exh. pp. 199-
200 (Bingham Aff. <H29) 
28.(10,6) At the time of the Hirschi Center purchase her sole assets consisted 
of time certificates of deposit accumulated from some income savings (App Ex p 47-
49, ((dep pp. 389-391, 418-421)) and some limited capital received from her father 
and the equity in her home. App Ex. pg. 20 (dep pp. 77-79); App Ex. pg 15 (dep pp. 
49-51). 
29.(10,6) The $181,000, Mr Rasekh had Ms. Bingham pay in down payment 
depleted all of her assets and left her with no operating or emergency capital. (App 
Exh. p. 21 , (dep p. 89); App Exh p. 33, (dep pp. 201-202). 
30.(10,6) At the time of closing Mr. Rasekh did require of Mrs. Bingham that 
she would have to pay more money than her $181,000 she had for the down 
payment, contrary to his prior representations, by surprising her with a $19,000 note 
the need for which prior thereto she was unaware. App Exh. p. 42 (dep pp. 323-
324); App Exh. p. 200 Bingham Aff. <H <H 30-31) 
31 .(11,7) Following closing she soon discovered that Mr. Rasekh had 
misrepresented the Hirschi Center (App Exh. p. 24, ((dep p. 117)); App Exh. p. 31 , 
((dep pp. 189-190)), and in order to stay in business she would have to meet costly 
permitting and safety requirements for which she was unprepared with no means to 
meet these costs. App Exh. pp. 27-28 (dep pp. 147-152); App Exh p. 43 (dep p. 
336); App Exh. pp. 200-201 (Bingham Aff. ^ 32), 
32.(11,7) Following closing It also became apparent to her that the amount of 
income being received from child day care was insufficient to meet the licensing 
requirements, mortgage payments and operating expenses and she would be 
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operating at a loss. App Exh. p. 33, (dep pp. 201-202); App Exh. p. 43 (dep pp. 333-
335); App Exh. p 201 (Bingham Aff. <H33). 
33.(11,7) The last minute $19,000 note and the Hirschi Center 
misrepresentations caused her to believe that she could no longer trust Rasekh. A 
friend, she hired to repair the smoke detectors and to install exit signs advised her to 
immediately sell the Hirschi Center and recover her savings. App Exh. pp. 201 
(Bingham Aff. <H 33-34) 
34.(11,12,7,8,) As a result of her friends advice and certain misrepresentations 
as made by Mr. Michael Drury, a representative of VR Utah, business brokers, she 
entered into an agreement with Mr. Michael Drury and VR Utah, to sell the Hirschi 
Center within three months which failed and she made a demand upon VR Utah to 
release her from the listing agreement. App Exh. pp. 107-113, 33-34 (dep p. 201, 
207); App Exh. pp. 201 (Bingham Aff. <H H 34-36, 39-42); App Exh. pp. 2-3, 12, 
49(b), 34 (dep pp. 206-208, 449-450, 462); App Exh. 50. 
35.(20,21) In desperation, the Appellant contacted Rasekh and told him she 
would not be able to make the monthly payments then due. She insisted he make 
good his promise to sell the property or buy her out. Defendant Rasekh told the 
Appellant that he would do nothing so long as the property was listed with VRUtah 
Business Brokers. App Exh. pp. 203(Bingham Aff. ^ ^43-44); App Exh. p 35, (dep 
pp. 237-238). 
36.(14-16,19,11,13) On or about March 2, 1995, Mr. Randall Roberts, a 
neighbor to the Hirschi's, had Steve Tate of Consolidated Realty Group present an 
offer to purchase the Hirschi property. (App. Exh. pg 62; App Exh. pp. 201 (Bingham 
Aff. <f]45). 
37.(14-16, 11-13,16) Mr. Roberts was never screened as a potential buyer. 
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(App Exh p. 11) The only way Mr. Roberts could complete a purchase was through 
the qualification of a prospectus with the governmental agencies regulating securities 
offerings in the hope of attracting investors. (App Exh. pg. 11 ; App Exh. pp. 203-204 
(Bingham Aff. *H46). Mr. Roberts had no means available to him at the time to 
purchase the property. App Exh. pp. 203-204, (Bingham Aff. ^ *|] 45-46, 50); App 
Exh. pp. 212-213, (Weston Aff. Till9-10); App. Exh pp. 4-5, 11, 62 and Roberts 
prospectus App Exh. pp. 124-145) 
38. (14-16,19,11 -13) Lacking the sophistication to evaluate Mr. Roberts 
offers, Mrs. Bingham engaged her brother as her agent. App Exh. pg 49(c) Mr. 
Weston then attended a meeting conducted by Mr. Roberts in Mr. Drury's office. 
After reviewing Mr. Roberts prospectus, (App Exh. pp 124-145) her brother advised 
her that Mr. Roberts did not have the means to fund his offer. App Exh. pp. 212-214, 
(Weston Aff. <H <H9-10,13); App Exh. pp. 203-204 (Bingham Aff. <U <H 45-46) 
39. (20-22, 18-19) The Appellant finally obtained a release from VR Utah in 
June 1995. She then contacted Rasekh and told him VRUtah Brokers had released 
and that he need to either buy the Hirschi Center or sell it immediately as I she 
would lose her life's savings. App Exh. pp. 205 (Bingham Aff. *H 52-53) 
40. (20-22, 18-19) Mr. Rasekh did nothing and she in fact lost her savings as a 
result of the Hirschi's foreclosure. App Exh. pp. 205 (Bingham Aff. ^ 52-53) 
4 1 . (23) Rasekh thereafter entered into an agreement with the Hirschis and 
again sold the Hirschi Center property to relatives and friends for $750,000, for 
which he aided in obtaining the financing utilizing his own credit. (App. Exh. pp 
226-229). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS. 
I. As a real estate agent Rasekh had a statutorily imposed fiduciary duty. He 
was also a limited agent and by statute any fiduciary duties that would create a 
conflict of interest with his duties to the seller were eliminated. Even as a limited 
agent though he retained the fiduciary duties of putting the interests of Bingham 
above his own and reasonable care and diligence, which duties he breached. 
II. There were sufficient summary judgment facts to create an issue of fact 
concerning the existence of a confidential relationship. The existence of a 
confidential relationship creates fiduciary duties, which duties Rasekh breached. 
III. The existence of a confidential relationship or fiduciary duties creates an 
exception to the statute of fraud barring the enforcement of oral promises made by 
the fiduciary. RaseklVs promise to repurchase the center was enforceable. 
IV. There is not sufficient summary judgment evidence in the record to base a 
finding that as a matter of law Bingham made it impossible for Rasekh to sell the 
center by listing the center with VR Utah. 
V. Since a fiduciary relationship existed Bingham had the right to rely on the 
representations made by Rasekh unless such reliance was unrational and she cannot 
be charged with lack of diligence in determining whether the representations are 
true. The court did not apply the correct standard and there was not sufficient 
summary judgment evidence to find the reliance was unrational. 
VI. There was not sufficient summary judgment evidence to form the basis for 
a finding that Rasekh made no negligent misrepresentations. Rasekh made 
representations that could be found to be misleading or erroneous. Any such 
responses about a sale amounts to misrepresentation. 
VII. The court made no specific finding that Bingham failed to mitigate her 
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damages, but even so there is not sufficient summary judgment evidence to support a 
finding of failure to mitigate 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT RASEKH OWED BINGHAM NO 
STATUTORILY IMPOSED FIDUCIARY DUTY THAT COULD BE BREACHED. 
In addressing Bingham's claim that Rasekh breached a statutorily imposed 
fiduciary duty the court simply stated in the memorandum decision page 4, , "The 
duty is created by law for real estate agent, and a fiduciary obligation, to the extent 
that the plaintiff would have this Court define the same, is not required of a real 
estate agent." The court found that no statutorily imposed fiduciary obligation 
applied to the facts of this case. 
Rasekh was a licensed real estate agent and acted as Bingham's real estate 
agent in purchasing the Hirshi Center. Rasekh also represented the seller in this 
transaction and as such by law he was a limited agent. Since in this case Rasekh was 
a limited agent, appellant gave up certain fiduciary duties. Wardley v. Welsh, 962 
P.2d 86, 346, footnote 4.(Utah 1998). The question that must be answered is 
whether by hiring appellee as a limited agent Bingham gave up the fiduciary duty, 
that appellee would otherwise owe by statute, of not putting RaseklVs interests 
above those of Bingham. In other words, because appellee was only a limited agent 
did he not have a fiduciary duty that would allow him to place his own interests 
above those of appellant? Could the legislature have intended to relieve a dual agent 
of this most basic of all fiduciary duties of avoiding self interest, while retaining other 
fiduciary duties? 
The court was in error when it found no statutory fiduciary duty to appellant. 
A licensed real estate agent or broker owes certain fiduciary duties as imposed by the 
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Utah Administrative Rules. Among these duties is the duty of loyalty. Utah 
Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.2(a), and the duty of reasonable care and 
diligence, Utah Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.2(a). 
Because in this case appellee was a limited agent he was relieved of certain 
fiduciary duties in those areas where a fiduciary duty to buyer would conflict with a 
fiduciary duty to buyer and visa versa. Utah Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.2(a); 
Wardley v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 346, footnote 4.(Utah 1998). On the other hand, 
even though appellee is a limited agent he still owed appellant certain fiduciary 
duties, and, "...The agent, acting in this neutral capacity, shall advance the interest 
of each party so long as it does not conflict with the interest of the other party ." Utah 
Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.3.1 (a). Only those fiduciary duties where such 
duties would create a conflict between the duties owed to both the buyer and seller 
are eliminated. Utah Administrative Rules R162- § 6.2.16.3.1 (a), and the agent is 
held to the standard of neutrality only in the event of conflicting interests. Utah 
Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.3.1 (a). The fiduciary duty of Reasonable care 
and diligence specifically survives a dual agent status Utah Administrative Rules 
R162- 6.2.16.3.1 (b). It should be obvious that the duty of loyalty, a far as it is 
defined as the obligation to act in the interest of the buyer instead of his own interest, 
also survives the dual agency because the agent "... acting in this neutral capacity, 
shall advance the interest of each party so long as it does not conflict with the 
interest of the other party ." Utah Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.3.1 (a). This 
duty of loyalty is basic to a fiduciary relationship and as long as the agent can remain 
neutral he must not put his interests above those of the buyer. 
None of the breaches of fiduciary duty claimed by appellant involve those 
fiduciary duties that would be eliminated because appellee was a limited agent. Her 
claims are that appellee convinced appellant to purchase the property so that he 
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could earn a large commission, that he mislead her when he told her the property 
was a good investment, that she had no risk, that she should rely on him and not 
others, and that he would buy back the property if it wasn't profitable for appellant. 
Even though the legislature did not specifically state that the duty of loyalty 
was retained by a limited agent, it is clear that the regulations only intended to 
eliminate those duties owed to the buyer and seller by a limited agent are inherently 
contradictory, (Utah Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.2(a)). It should be assumed 
that the legislature intended to eliminate all fiduciary duties that would fit within that 
inherently contradictory category and retain the rest. 
In construing a statute the purpose is to give effect to the legislative intent and 
the purpose lying behind it. In the matter of the estate of Greenwood, 326 P.2d 400, 
7 Utah 2d 405. When applying this principle the intention wil l prevail over the 
literal sense of the terms; and its reason and intention wil l prevail over the strict 
letter. In the matter of the estate of Greenwood, Id. In order to give the statute the 
implementation which wil l fulfill its purpose, reason and intention sometimes prevail 
over technically applied Mteralness. Andrus v. Allred, 404 P.2d 972, 1 7 Utah 2d 
106. 
This statute should be interpreted so as to not eliminate the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty as long as under the facts present there is no actual conflict with the other 
party and the duty to not engage in self dealing should never be eliminated because 
self dealing never creates a conflict of interest with the other party and always creates 
a conflict of interest with whom the agent is self dealing. The statute specifically 
requires the agent to advance the interests of appellant as long as it does not conflict 
with the interest of the seller. Utah Administrative Rules R162- 6.2.16.3.1(a). The 
duty of loyalty to appellant above loyalty to seller may not survive because appellee 
was a limited agent, but the duty of loyalty to appellant over appellee's own 
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interests certainly did survive. The court fai led to recognize this statutorily imposed 
fiduciary duty and this f inding should be reversed. 
I I . 
THE COURT ERRED W H E N IT DETERMINED THAT N O CONFIDENTIAL 
RELATIONSHIP EXISTED 
Whether a confidential relationship exists is a question of fact. Rhoads v. 
Harvey Publications, Inc., 145 Ariz. 142, 148, 700 P.2d 840, 846 (App. 1984). If a 
confidential relationship exists it gives rise to f iduciary duties because Confidential 
and fiduciary relationships are in the law synonymous. Fipps v. Stidham 50 P. 2d 680, 174 
Okl. 473. A f iduciary or confidential relationship may be created by circumstances 
where equity w i l l imply a higher duty in a relationship because the trusting party has 
been induced to relax the care and vigilance he wou ld ordinari ly exercise. Hal 
Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), or when one party, 
after having gained the trust and confidence of another, exercises extraordinary 
influence over the other party. In re Estate of Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah App. 
1988). Although Rasekh did not claim in his motion for summary judgment that a 
confidential relationship did not exist the court determined on its own that no such 
relationship was shown. 
It is not incumbent on Bingham to prove the existence of a confidential relationship 
unless Rasekh has first raised evidence that such does not exist. A plaintiff is not 
required to produce summary judgment evidence raising a material fact question 
on an essential element of its claim until the defendant/movant first conclusively 
negates such an element by summary judgment evidence. If the defendant's 
summary judgment evidence conclusively negates such an element, the plaintiff 
must then present summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue as to that 
element. If it does so, summary judgment is not proper. Gibbs v. General Motors 
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589, Texs 1989; Christensen v. Sherwood Insurance Services, 758 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 
App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied); Orozco v. Texas General Indemnity Co., 611 
S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1981, no writ). 
Bingham first requests that this court determine that Bingham had no 
obligation to present evidence of a confidential relationship in response to the 
summary judgment motion, or in the alternative that she did present evidence raising 
a fact issue concerning the existence of a confidential relationship. Bingham's claims 
of trust and reliance are fact questions unless patently unrheritorious are for the jury 
and not to be decided by summary judgment. Hilton v. Texas Investment Bank, N.A., 
650 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, no writ); Kolb v. Texas 
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 585 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. 1979) 
In the case of In re Brodbeck,, v James, 915 P.2d 145 (Kan. 1996), the court 
determined that acts that could also be viewed simply as acts of kindness could also 
be viewed as acts showing the requisite reliance and trust to survive a motion for 
summary judgment. The jury rather than the court should be making that judgment. 
A confidential relationship may arise under circumstances in which a person 
occupies a superior position over another with the opportunity to use that 
superiority to his advantage over the other. United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., 164 Colo. 42, 433 P.2d 769 (1967). 
Similarly, a confidential relationship may arise if: (1) one party has taken steps 
to induce another to believe that it can safely rely on the first party's judgment or 
advice, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 d comment f (1982); (2) one 
person has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the 
other's interest in mind, see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 comment b (1959); or 
(3) the parties7 relationship is such that one is induced to relax the care and vigilance 
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one ordinarily would exercise in dealing with a stranger, see Dolton v. Capitol 
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21 (Colo. App. 1981). 
The facts and circumstances must indicate that the one reposing the trust has 
foundation for his belief that the one giving advice or presenting arguments is acting 
not in his own behalf, but in the interests of the other party." Burwell v. South 
Carolina Natl Bank, 288 S.C. 34, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986). In other words, the 
plaintiff must show some dependency on his or her part and some undertaking by 
the defendant to advise, counsel and protect the weaker party. For example, a 
plaintiff's lack of business expertise, and a defendant's undertaking the 
responsibility of providing financial advice to a close friend or family member, may 
indicate a fiduciary relationship. McGowan v. PillsburyQo., ITS F. Supp. 530, 536 
(W.D. Wash. 1989). 
The summary judgment evidence before the court to support the existence of 
a confidential relationship, which taken as true show Bingham's dependency on 
Rasekh and his undertaking to provide financial advice to a close friend was the 
following: 
1. Appellant was unsophisticated. She was a divorcee with nine children. 
Her entire work experience had been a sales clerk and substitute teacher. Her 
education was high school and two years of part time schooling to qualify for 
entrance into a nursing curriculum. She had never worked in or operated a day care 
center. 
2. Appellee was a real estate agent who told her to not trust the advice of her 
brother or daughters because they were not as successful as him. 
3. Appellant did not comprehend the magnitude of the transaction concerning 
the Hirschi Center. 
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4. Appellee ingratiated himself into appellant's family, referring to appellant 
as his American Mom. At one point appellee asked appellant if he could marry one 
of her daughters as a way of obtaining U.S. citizenship. Appellee took appellant's 
minor daughter to Egypt to the marriage of his sister. 
5. Appellee became appellant's financial advisor and appellant relied on him 
to make her business decisions. Appellant believed that he would protect her and 
look out for her best interests. 
6. Appellant reposed complete trust in appellee, to the extent that she signed 
the purchase documents without reading them, ignored contrary advice from her 
friends, brother and daughters and invested all of her money in the day care center 
leaving her with no remaining funds. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The promise of appellee to appellant that she had no risk in purchasing the 
day care center, and which induced her to invest everything she had into the 
business, upon the promise that appellee would buy it back if it were not successful 
is the most important aspect of appellant's case. This is the promise that provided 
Plaintiff with a no risk investment. It is her position that she would never had 
entered into the transaction without this promise and that she had total trust in 
appellee. 
Appellee argued to the court and the court accepted the proposition that such 
promise in this case was unenforceable because it violated the statute of frauds. 
Because the promise if violated would be a violation of the fiduciary duty appellee 
owed to appellant and not just a violation of an oral contract, the promise is taken 
out of the purview of the statute of frauds and is enforceable because a confidential 
relationship or fiduciary duty creates an exception to the statute of frauds. Swon v. 
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Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18, 24-26 (Mo. 1955); Crane v. Centerre Bank of Columbia, 
691 S.W.2d 423, 425-26 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985); see also John D. Calamari & Joseph 
M. Perillo, Contracts § 19-46 (3d ed. 1987). W.G. Jenkins & Co. v. Standrod, (1928) 
46 Idaho 614, 269 P. 586; see 72 Am.Jur.2d Statute of Frauds § 176 at 707 (1974) 
and Brock & Davis Co., Inc. v. Charleston National Bank, (S.D. W.Va. 1977) 443 
F.Supp. 1175, Teetling v. Indiana State Bank, 436 N.E.2d 855, Jarnigan v. Busby, 
867 P.2d63, (Colo. 1993). 
VI 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT BINGHAM'S ACTION 
PREVENTED RASEKH FROM SELLING 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL: 
Summary judgment is granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court views "the facts 
in a light most favorable to trie losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). 
The court in the memorandum decision page 5 determined that the promise of 
Rasekh to resell the property if it was unprofitable would preclude summary 
judgment and then court went on to find that Bingham's own actions prohibiting 
Rasekh from selling the property precludes the claim as a matter of law. 
The question that must be asked is how would listing with VR Brokers 
preclude Rasekh from selling? Why couldn't Rasekh attempt to sell the property 
while it was listed with VR Brokers? In fact VR Brokers released their listing in 
sufficient time to sell the Hirschi Center before it was foreclosed. Rasekh made no 
effort to sell the property either while it was listed or after the listing was released, in 
fact he denies he made any such promise. If he made no effort to sell how can there 
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be uncontroverted evidence that Bingham's action made it impossible for him to sell. 
V. 
BINGHAM HAD THE RIGHT TO RELY ON RASEKH'S REPRESENTATIONS. 
One has the right to rely on the representations of a fiduciary unless 
such reliance is irrational. Field v. Century 21, 63 Cal. App.4th 18, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
784, 1998. It is well settled that a representee has a right to rely upon representations 
where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between the parties. Hugh v. 
Kennedy, 22 N.C. App. 509; 207 S.E.2d 301. In such cases a high degree of 
frankness and fair dealing is required, and the representee cannot be charged with 
lack of diligence in failing to make an independent investigation, either at the time 
or afterward." 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 254, p. 342. "It is a well settled 
principle of the law of fraud, applied particularly by courts of equitable jurisdiction, 
that it is the duty of a person in whom confidence is reposed by virtue of the 
situation of trust arising out of a confidential or fiduciary relationship to make a full 
disclosure of any and all material facts within his knowledge relating to a 
contemplated transaction with the other party to such relationship, and any 
concealment or failure to disclose such facts is a fraud." Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 
63 S.E.2d 
Rasekh by claiming that Appellant had no right to rely on what he said is 
really making the argument that she should not be able to recover because of her 
contributory negligence, but where a fiduciary relationship exists the buyer has the 
right to rely on the representations of the broker and contributory negligence is not a 
defense. Neff v. Bud Lewis Co., 89 N.M. 145, 548 P.2d 107 (N.M.Q.App.1976). 
VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING NO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS 
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Even without a fiduciary duty the claim of negligent misrepresentation should 
survive summary judgment. Bingham alleges that Rasekh made certain negligent 
misrepresentations to her that induced her to purchase the Hirschi property. The 
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is not based on failure to disclose, but 
rather on incorrect disclosures. The case of Schroeder v. Rose, 701 P. 2d 327 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1985), which was cited by Rasekh, makes it clear that misleading or 
erroneous responses about a sale amounts to misrepresentation. (See also PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS §106 at 738 and §107 at 745 (5th ed. 1984). In alleging 
negligent misrepresentation Appellant does not contend that Rasekh had the 
obligation to investigate everything about the business and report it to Appellant, but 
rather that he had the obligation to properly investigate and accuracy of any 
representations that he did make about the business. Bingham alleges that the 
following representations were not true and were an inducement to purchase the 
property. 
(a) that the Hirschi Center purchase price was fair, was not unconscionable, 
and constitute a prudent investment for the Plaintiff. 
(b) That the Hirschi's business had sufficient cash flow to meet all expenses 
and contingencies including the payments on the first trust deed note which 
Plaintiff would be obligated to pay. 
(c) the income from the Hirschi Center business would provide all the income 
and investment needs of both the Plaintiff, her family and his sister, 
( d) that he had conducted a business and investment analysis of the Hirschi's 
business which he had found to be so profitable that he had written on top of 
the listing agreement that his father, who was interested in the property on 
behalf of his sister, would be exempt from the realtor fee, 
(e) that when Plaintiff took over the Hirschi's business that she could step into 
the shoes of the Hirschi's and continue to operate the day care business 
without the need for the further investment, 
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(f) that Marleen, the Hirschi's daughter, who was managing the Hirschi's child 
day care business was a duly qualified manager and would teach her how to 
manage and operate the business, 
(g) That both Marleen and the present employees had agreed to stay for a 
minimum of six months, 
(h) that the employees would be will ing to stay longer if she was will ing to 
continue their employment, 
(I) That all lesson plans respecting the day care of the children were all in 
place, 
(j) that Marleen and the present staff would instruct her in the teaching 
methods such that before Marleen left she would be proficient in the use of the 
lesson plans, 
(k) that all the permits for operating the business were in place and would not 
have to be changed or altered, 
(I) that the day care business was in compliance with all state codes and 
regulations, 
(m) that the buildings comprising the Hirschi Center were in a good state of 
repair, 
(n) that all the equipment was in good operating condition. 
VII. 
FAILURE TO MITIGATE DAMAGES IS AN ISSUE FOR TRIAL. 
Although the court did not grant summary judgment on the issue of mitigation 
raised by Rasekh, the court did state at page 6 of the memorandum decision as 
follows: "For the foregoing reasons, together with the reasons set forth by counsel for 
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Rasekh in both the written submissions and oral argument, the defendant's Motion is 
granted. 
Since the court addressed every other issue with particularity Bingham does 
not think the court intended to grant summary judgment based upon a finding that 
she failed to mitigate her damages, but in an abundance of caution this issue is 
raised. Also the issue of mitigation may come up in the future by motion and 
Bingham requests the court's guidance on the issue. 
1. APPELLANT MADE EVERY EFFORT TO MITIGATE HER DAMAGES 
Within days of purchasing the Hirschi Center Appellant realized that Mr. 
Rasekh got her into a deal that would not work. Once she was out of his control and 
able to think clearly she could see that she had no money and no experience to run a 
day care center. She could see that she may lose her down payment and she 
immediately began the effort to mitigate her damages. She never wanted to make a 
profit, but only to recoup her down payment. When the offer to purchase came from 
Mr. Roberts Appellant approached her brother, who she trusted and asked for his 
advice. He told her not to accept the offer because Mr. Roberts had no money of his 
own and the offer was contingent on raising the $150,000.00 down payment by 
soliciting investors. Appellant's brother advised her that it would be fool hardy to tie 
up the property for 90 days for Mr. Roberts to attempt to raise money. He advised 
her to hold Mr. Rasekh to his promise to sell or buy the property. The obvious proof 
of the lack of the bone fides of Mr. Roberts offer was his failure to pay one penny 
toward the lease obligation that he later signed for the Hirschi Center. 
The burden of proving Appellant has not mitigated her damages and that the 
award should be correspondingly reduced is on defendant. John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. 
Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990), Lebaron v. Rebel Enterprises, 
25 
823 P.2d 479 (Utah 1991). Appellant cannot be faulted for not accepting a frivolous 
offer. It is up to Rasekh to prove that if Appellant had accepted the offer from Mr. 
Roberts he would have been able to come up with the down payment and made the 
contract payments thereafter. No proof has been made to this court that the offer 
was bone fide or that Mr. Roberts would have performed any better if that offer had 
been accepted than he did when his later offer to lease was accepted. If there was 
any evidence that Roberts was capable of performing on his offer Rasekh could have 
presented it to this court and did not. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in applying the law in determining that there was no statutory 
imposed fiduciary duty. The court also erred in applying the law in determining that 
the statute of frauds applied. 
Either Bingham had no duty to present summary judgment evidence of a 
confidential relationship or in the alternative sufficient summary judgment evidence 
was presented to present to create a factual issue concerning the existence of a 
confidential relationship. Bingham presented sufficient summary judgment evidence 
of a breach of fiduciary duty by alleging that Rasekh induced her to purchase the 
Hirschi Center by telling her that it was a good investment, that she had no risk, that 
he would buy it back from her if it didn't work out and by telling her to ignore the 
advise of her family and friends not to buy the Hirschi Center. In addition Bingham 
presented sufficient summary judgment evidence of negligent misrepresentations. 
Summary Judgment should be reversed and Bingham should be allowed to 
persuade a jury that there was breaches of fiduciary duty and negligent 
misrepresentations. 
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Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 2002. 
r 
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Ronaldi l ieorge, attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIE BINGHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDAL ROBERTS, MICHAEL DRURY, 
VRUtah, Inc., a Utah Corporation 
KAL RASEKH, an individual, 
COLDWELL BANKER PREMIER REALTY, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
HARVEY C. HIRSCHI and LOIS R. 
HIRSCHI, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970901897 
Third Judse;.. L „.J 
OCT 10 :;:3 
SALT LAKE COL HVf 
Dcpm, 
This matter was before the Court for oral argument on 
defendants VR Utah, Drury and Rasekhfs Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The Court had previously granted Summary Judgment as to 
defendants Hirschi by way of Minute Entry, dated August 14, 2000. 
On September 18, 2000, the Court heard oral argument from 
counsel for the moving defendants and the plaintiff. The Court 
took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of oral argument 
to consider the arguments presented and to once again review the 
legal authorities submitted by the parties. The Court has 
accomplished those tasks and being fully advised, enters the 
following Memorandum Decision. 
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Dealing first with the Motion of VR Utah and Michael Drury, 
the Court is satisfied that that Motion must be granted. The 
substance of the plaintiff's claims against these defendants are 
that Drury promised to sell the property for $1 million within 
three months and that if it could not be sold# he would release the 
listing, which was for one year# that defendants VR Utah and Drury 
failed to use reasonable and acceptable efforts to sell the 
property, and, finally, defendants failed to release the listing 
timely, based upon the claimed oral promise to sell within three 
months. 
In response to those claims, the defendants Drury and VR Utah 
contend initially that the plaintiff, by accepting VR Utah's 
Release agreement, is estopped from asserting claims against the 
defendants. The plaintiff counters that she did not sign the 
Release agreement, but in her deposition the plaintiff apparently 
testified under oath that she accepted the Release agreement. 
Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on 
that issue alone. 
Further, the plaintiff's claim that there was an oral promise 
to sell the property for $1 million within three months or release 
the listing is not well taken. There was an agreement between the 
parties for listing the property that does not provide as the 
plaintiff suggests. The agreement does not provide for selling the 
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property within three months and does not provide that if it is not 
sold within three months, that the listing agreement would be 
revoked. A reading of the document shows it to be an integrated 
document and it specifically indicates that there are no oral 
promises or agreements other than what is contained in the 
document. 
Based upon the foregoing, as well as the other arguments 
asserted by counsel for defendants Drury and VR in its moving 
papers and in oral argument, the Court is satisfied that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact, and further that the defendants 
Drury and VR are entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintifffs 
claims. 
The defendants also seek an award of attorney's fees. 
Paragraph 13 of the listing agreement provides that if litigation 
is commenced incident to the listing agreement, that the defendants 
are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees, together with 
costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court is required to grant 
the defendants' request for fees based upon the listing agreement 
between the plaintiff and the defendants VR Utah and Drury. 
Counsel for defendants may submit an appropriate Affidavit with the 
Order granting Summary Judgment. The Order granting Summary 
Judgment and awarding fees should be prepared in such a fashion so 
as to allow the Court to insert an amount of attorney's fees once 
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the Court has reviewed the defendants' counsel's Affidavit in 
connection therewith. 
Turning to the Motion for Summary Judgment sought by defendant 
Kal Rasekh# the Court is equally convinced that it is required to 
grant Summary Judgment in favor of defendant Rasekh and against the 
plaintiff on the plaintiff's claims against said defendant. 
The plaintiff claims that there was a confidential 
relationship between herself and the defendant Rasekh, and that 
that confidential relationship creates a fiduciary duty. In the 
first instance, a close personal relationship does not necessarily 
create a fiduciary duty. The duty is created by law for a real 
estate agent, and a fiduciary obligation, to the extent that the 
plaintiff would have this Court define the same, is not required of 
a real estate agent. The plaintiff's claims that she had no 
control over her free will and the decisions she made to buy this 
property is belied by the fact that she did conduct an independent 
investigation, consulted an accountant, and consulted a trusted 
family member who, in fact, recommended against the purchase. 
There is no evidence in the record that would support a submission 
to the jury that the plaintiff's ability to make her own decisions 
had been overpowered by the defendant Rasekh because of their 
personal relationship. 
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The plaintiff has conceded the fifth cause of action against 
defendant Rasekh on the basis of conflict of interest. 
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that defendant Rasekh made an 
oral promise to her that he would sell the property if the purchase 
she was making did not work out. While that oral promise, the 
existence of which is disputed by defendant Rasekh, would create a 
question of fact that would prohibit Summary Judgment, the 
plaintiff's own actions prohibiting defendant Rasekh from 
attempting to resell the property after the plaintiff determined 
that the purchase was inappropriate, precludes her claim as a 
matter of law. Immediately after purchasing the property, the 
plaintiff granted an exclusive listing for one year to Drury and VR 
Utah. Under that listing agreement, defendant Rasekh could not 
have undertaken to sell the property, assuming for the sake of this 
Motion that there was an oral promise to do so. Plaintiff's own 
actions have prohibited defendant Rasekh from complying with the 
oral promise that the plaintiff claims existed. 
Defendant Rasekh had no legal duty to investigate, as real 
estate agent in this matter, for both the seller and 
plaintiff/buyer. The fact that he did not know of the claimed 
falsities of the Hirschi's (previously dismissed) is undisputed. 
As previously indicated, Utah case law clearly indicates that real 
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estate agents are not expected and not required to investigate 
properties they are selling. 
Finally, the plaintiff claims that there was an oral agreement 
on the part of defendant Rasekh to repurchase the center if it was 
unprofitable. That oral agreement is unenforceable under the 
statute of frauds, the plaintiff's arguments notwithstanding. 
Finally, the plaintiff claims that defendant Rasekh was 
unjustly enriched as a result of the November, 1995, foreclosure. 
As a matter of law, there is no evidence to support an allegation 
of unjust enrichment for Mr. Rasekh after the property was 
foreclosed upon by the Hirschis, in trying to sell the property on 
their behalf. 
For the foregoing reasons, together with the reasons set forth 
by counsel for Rasekh in both the written submissions and oral 
argument, the defendant's Motion is granted. 
Defendant Rasekh is apparently seeking fees based upon the 
listing agreements of September 6, 1995, and October 27, 1995. The 
listing agreements above-referenced are not the basis upon which 
this Court is granting Summary Judgment, and accordingly there is 
no basis to award fees in favor of the defendant Rasekh and against 
the plaintiff. To the extent that defendant Rasekh is seeking 
fees, those are denied. 
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The Court will expect Orders granting Summary Judgment as to 
defendants Drury and VR, and defendant Rasekh, to be submitted in 
accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
specifically setting forth the basis upon which this Court is 
granting Summary Judgment. 
Dated this /0day of October, 2 000. 
/ * 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
